On the human rights, justice and morality in India.

In the first part of this paper I will characterize the specific nature of rational intuition. It will be claimed that rational intuition is an evidential state with modal content that has an a priori source. This claim will be defended against several objections. The second part of the paper deals with the so-called explanationist objection against rational intuition as a justifying source. According to the best reading of this objection, intuition cannot justify any judgment since there is no metaphysical (...) explanation of its reliability. It will be argued that in the case of intuition the very demand of such an explanation is based on a category mistake. (shrink)

The construction and use of space is highly structuring in the lives of household members of both human and non-human animals. The choice of social practice is embedded in the ways in which both human and non-human animals physically organize the world around them. The architectural vestiges of houses—both in terms of the distribution of material culture within and surrounding them, and architectural choices—provide frameworks for a social practice that was shared between humans and living, domestic animals, or animal materiality. (...) The notion of meeting points is explored via both its tangible and metaphorical aspects to approach the meetings—the physical performances and their significance—of humans and animals in the past. To gauge the potential likenesses and differences, two case studies are compared from the Late Bronze Age in Scandinavia and Early Iron Age in Sicily. Both case studies represent societies where domestic animals were present and formed part of the household subsistence. A framework is presented that takes into consideration the spatial potential of allowing human-animal relationships to unfold within the framework of the everyday social practice of the household. (shrink)

Commentary on Yogasūtra, aphoristic work on the basic tenets of the Yoga school in Hindu philosophy, by Patañjali; includes text in Sanskrit.

For Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is to be distinguished from all contents of consciousness that might be introspectively detectable: It is precisely consciousness of whatever contents it is conscious of and not itself one of these contents. Its only nature is, Advaita holds, prakāśa ; in itself it is devoid of any content or structure and can never become an object. This paper elaborates on this kind of understanding of consciousness in order to next explain why it might be fruitful (...) for developing a clear understanding of the nature of the so-called problem of consciousness. Today’s philosophy of mind tends to conceive of consciousness in terms of qualia, thereby taking it as a special kind of object. This renders the antimaterialist claim of the distinctness of consciousness from all physical features vulnerable to the materialist reply that the difference in question might be a merely epistemological matter, i.e., a matter of different modes of givenness without difference in what is thus given. This move, however – this paper argues –, is impossible without resulting in circularity or infinite regress with regard to consciousness in the sense of givenness itself. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African ethics by Thaddeus Metz translated into Igbo by M. B. Mbah, and edited by Prof Lawrence Ogbo Ugwuanyi of the University of Abuja, Nigeria.

In this paper some properties of epi-representations and Schmidt-congruence relations of orthomodular partial algebras are investigated and an infinite list of OMA-epi-subdirectly irreducible orthomodular partial algebras will be constructed.

In this paper some properties of epi-representations and Schmidt-congruence relations of orthomodular partial algebras are investigated and an infinite list of OMA-epi-subdirectly irreducible orthomodular partial algebras will be constructed.

Critical study of selected portion of Yogavāsiṣṭha, treatise on Vedanta philosophy; includes translation of text and commentary.

Oma algses mitmetähenduslikkuses on see F. Baconi aforism kõige tihendatum tõdemus, mis tõmbab olemusliku eraldusjoone ühelt poolt antiikse ja keskaegse ning teisalt uusaegse arusaama vahele teadusest ja teadusteadmisest. Artiklis püüab autor anda võimaluste piires tervikpildi uusaja teaduse industriaalselt (tehnoloogiliselt) orienteeritud teadmistüübi tekkimisest. Uusaja teaduse kujunemiseks vajaliku pöörde maailmavaateliste eeldustena tuleb käsitleda: (1) põhimõtteliselt uut subjekti ja objekti käsitust; (2) täiesti uut väärtusruumi, uut teaduse ideoloogiat (ilmalikkus, kriitiline vaim, tõesus ja praktiline kasulikkus); (3) tunnetuslaadi muutust — kontemplatsioonilt interventsioonile, kvaliteedi kirjeldamiselt kvantiteedi (...) uurimisele; (4) looduse käsitlemist Kosmose asemel seaduspäraselt korrastatud objektide “väljana”. Uue tunnetusstiili — empiirilise ja teoreetilise tunnetuse kokkuviimine, hüpoteetilis-deduktiivse metodoloogia kujundamine Galilei poolt, abstraktse ja sünteetilis-tekstilise loomuga spekulatsiooni asendumine uurimisobjekti ehituse, korrapära ja põhjuslikkuse objektiivse analüüsiga, universaalsete loodusseaduste doktriini kujunemine jms—kujunemine konstitueeris uut tüüpi teadmise. Teadmise kui nähtava maailma piltkoopia asemele luuakse teadmine kui loodusobjektide seaduspära analüütiline rekonstruktsioon. See on vormiltmatemaatiline, päritolult eksperimentaalne ning loodusobjektide kontrollimisele ja ümbertegemisele suunatud nn valdamisteadmine. This F. Bacon's aphorism in its original ambiguity is the most condensed belief that draws a distinctive essential line between ancient and medieval understanding of science and scientific knowledge on one hand and modern understanding on the other. The author aims at providing, as far as possible, an integral overview of emerging of the industrially (technologically) orientated type of knowledge of modern times. Ideological/philosophical preconditions of the change necessary for emerging of modern science are: (1) a fundamentally new approach to the subject and object; (2) a completely new system of values, a new ideology of science (secularity, critical spirit, trueness and utilitarianism); (3) a change in manner of cognizance - from contemplation to intervention, from describing quality to studying quantity; (4) treating nature as a naturally organised "field" of objects instead of the Cosmos. Emerging of a new style of cognizance - bringing together of empirical and theoretical cognition, the devise of the hypothetical-deductive method by Galilei, replacement of speculations abstract and synthetic-textual in nature with objective study of the structure, regularity and causality of the object of study, establishment of the doctrine of universal natural laws etc - constituted a new type of knowledge. Knowledge as a copy of the visible world is replaced by knowledge as an analytical reconstruction of the regularity of natural objects. It is so-called dispositive knowledge, morphologically mathematical, originally experimental and aimed at control and alteration of natural objects. (shrink)

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection using the key metaphors of light and reflective awareness. This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the (...) concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper. (shrink)

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection using the key metaphors of light and reflective awareness. This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the (...) concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Abstract:Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1040) holds three conflicting positions: luminosity (prakāśa) is the ultimately real nature of consciousness; luminosity and appearances (ākāras) are identical; and appearances are false (alīka) because they are targeted by the neither-one-nor-many argument. But why is luminosity not false, too, given its identity with appearances? In response to this worry, Ratnākaraśānti develops a notion of identity (tādātmya) that lets him claim that, although luminosity and appearance are composed of the same stuff, they are not identical in every (...) respect. On the basis of this, he limits the scope of the neither-one-nor-many argument such that it targets appearances but not luminosity. Other philosophers (and possibly Ratnākaraśānti himself) then further limit the argument's scope, showing that it also does not target experiences of pleasure (sukha) and, crucially for their buddhology, the innate bliss (sahajānanda) that characterizes the experience of buddhahood. (shrink)

In the celebrated tantric manual, the Tantrāloka, Abhinavagupta and his commentator Jayaratha establish a non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection using the key metaphors of light and reflective awareness. This paper attempts to explain the philosophical problem of reflection from the standpoint of these non-dual Śaivas. It also evaluates the problem in its hermeneutical context, analysing multiple layers of meaning and interpretation. Is the metaphor of reflection only a way of explaining the particular currents of the Śaiva phenomenology represented by the (...) concepts of prakāśa and vimarśa? What philosophical problem does Abhinavagupta seek to solve by complicating the category of reflection and giving it a quasi-paradoxical status? Why does he use the model of the subtle elements to explain the theory of reflection? What does the ‘untaintedness of the mirror of consciousness’ mean for his system? These questions form the focus of this paper. (shrink)

Landscape Agency New York was founded by Gavin Keeney, c.1997, and encompassed a wide array of activities and effects – e.g., research, writing, design, consulting, and teaching. /S/OMA (Syntactical Operations Metaphorical Affects) was the mobile, and sometimes global design and teaching module within LANY, focusing primarily on entirely hypothetical and/or irreal projects, many becoming the foundation for lectures and courses delivered at institutions in the US, Canada, Australia, and Europe, from 2003 to 2007. Lastly, the LANY Archive-Grotto was established following (...) publication of On the Nature of Things: Contemporary American Landscape Architecture (Birkhauser, 2001), primarily as a means of escaping the then-formulaic production of texts common to Landscape Architecture and Architecture. (shrink)

Hobbesian accounts of public reason are forced to face a tension that is presented for any theorist that toes the Hobbesian line. This tension has been referred to as the “Hobbesian Dilemma.” On one horn, we are afraid that we might create a monster with our authorization of an absolute sovereign. On the other horn, we are afraid that if we do not hand over unlimited power to the sovereign we will not be freed from the conflict that is endemic (...) to our reliance upon private pluralistic standards. These Hobbesians, stressing the first horn, are afraid of authorizing a supreme political entity, so they provide modifications that serve to restrict such an entity. Such modifications, however, necessarily reintroduce pluralism back into the commonwealth. But if we take Hobbes seriously and accept that pluralism generates a state of war, the reintroduction of pluralism must be viewed as disastrous. (shrink)

The essay deals with the formation of the Greimassian thought from its earliest origins in his young years at Kaunas University, i.e. his connections with Wilhelm Sesemann, Lev Karsavin and Russian formalism, to the rise of structuralism in Paris. The Paris School approach stems from Semantique structurale (1967) leading to the ‘third semiotic revolution’, as Greimas called it, by the invention of the modalities. This made his method close to even analytic philosophy and modal logics. In both, a linguistic turn (...) and use of formal logics took place. Yet Greimas’ semiotics grew out of a purely linguistic framework into a broader philosophical approach. Nowadays, considered one of the classics of the semiotic scene, his method still has not lost anything of its analytic acuity and epistemic temptation. Even such new paradigms as existential semiotics grow organically from some Greimas’ ideas which have kept their relevance.В статье исследуется формирование научных взглядов Греймаса: юность в Каунасском университете, знакомство с Василием Сеземаном, Львом Карсавиным и идеями русского формализма, рождение структурализма в Париже. Основой парижской школы семиотики стала книга Греймаса Semantique structurale (1967), которая, по его словам, привела к ≪третьей семиотической революции≫ благодаря изобретению модальностей. Это сблизило метод Греймаса с аналитической философией и модальной логикой. В обеих науках произошел лингвистический поворот и стали пользоваться формальной логикой. Семиотика Греймаса преодолела рамки чистой лингвистики, став более широким философским подходом. Сейчас его метод считается классикой семиотики. Однако метод Греймаса не потерял своей аналитической остроты и эпистемологической привлекательности. Даже такие новые парадигмы, как экзистенциальная семиотика, органически вырастают из идей Греймаса, сохранивших свою актуальность.Artikkel kasitleb Greimase mottemaailma valjakujunemist alates selle varaseimatest allikatest, mis parinesid noorusaastatest Kaunase Ulikoolis, s.t tema sidemetest Wilhelm Sesemanni, Lev Karsavini ja vene vormikoolkonnaga, kuni strukturalismi tekkimiseni Pariisis. Pariisi koolkonna lahenemise aluseks on Semantique structurale (1967), mis toob kaasa “kolmanda semiootilise revolutsiooni”, nagu Greimas seda nimetas, leiutades modaalsused. See muutis tema meetodi sarnaseks ingliskeelse analuutilise fi losoofi a ja modaalloogikaga, kus molemas toimus lingvistiline poore ning hakati kasutama formaalloogikat. Ent Greimase semiootika kasvas puhtlingvistilisest raamistikust valja avaramaks fi losoofi liseks lahenemiseks. Tanapaeval, mil tema meetodit peetakse semiootikavaldkonna klassikasse kuuluvaks, ei ole see kaotanud midagi oma analuutilisest teravusest ja episteemilisest koitvusest. Isegi sellised uued paradigmad nagu eksistentsiaalne semiootika kasvavad orgaaniliselt valja monedest Greimase ideedest, mis on sailitanud oma relevantsuse. (shrink)

Open-mindedness appears as a potential intellectual virtue from the beginning of the rise of the literature on intellectual virtues. It often takes up a special role, sometimes thought of as a meta-virtue rather than a first-order virtue: as an ingredient that makes other virtues virtuous. Jason Baehr has attempted to give a unified account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue. He argues that the conceptual core of open-mindedness lies in the fact that a person departs, moves beyond, or transcends a (...) certain default cognitive standpoint. Two of his main aims are to show that (1) one does not need to assume a doxastic conflict or disagreement to be at the heart of open-mindedness—that is, there are also instances where the virtue of open-mindedness is needed when there is no opposing view to be considered—and (2) that not all forms of open-mindedness include rational assessment—that is, sometimes being open-minded is not about weighing evidence for and against a claim. So, his main aim is to show that there are various situations that afford open-mindedness, in each of which a slightly different kind of open-mindedness is called for. To unify all these different kinds of open-mindedness is then the goal of his work. He arrives at the following definition of open-mindedness (OM): an open-minded person is characteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a distinct cognitive standpoint. In this article, I take seriously Baehr’s suggestion of how to understand open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue and argue that the crux lies in formulating how we can be able to transcend a default cognitive standpoint. This is not as obvious as it has been taken to be in the literature on open-mindedness. Biases, overconfidence, and wishful thinking are difficult exactly because we don’t know that we are engaging in them. That is, they are systematically hidden from our consciousness, otherwise they would not be a bias, overconfidence, or wishful thinking. Hence, the crux of making open-mindedness open-minded is to see how it is possible to make something of one’s own mind visible that is systematically hidden from oneself. I argue that this problem can be solved by looking at research on attention. I base my considerations in this article on Sebastian Watzl’s account of attention, which essentially holds that paying attention is an activity of foregrounding and backgrounding mental contents. That is, attention is the activity of structuring mental contents into a priority structure of foreground and background. If I pay attention to the scene in front of me, I foreground the black letters on my screen, and I background the coffee cup next to them. In this way, I create a priority structure between the letters (as they appear to me) and the coffee cup (as it appears to me). I argue that what allows us to make something of our own mind visible that is systematically hidden from us is a special way of paying attention, hence a special way of foregrounding and backgrounding the involved mental contents. That is, the crux of what enables us to transcend a default cognitive standpoint, the conceptual core of open-mindedness, is a special kind of attention, which I will call ‘open-minded attention’ (OMA). The claim of this article is not that open-minded attention fully describes the virtue of open-mindedness (OMA is not sufficient for open-mindedness). Rather, what I try to show is that in all cases of open-mindedness it turns out that open-minded attention is the necessary component that ensures that we can indeed get rid of prior biases, that is, transcend also those implicit beliefs and expectations that are systematically hidden from us (OMA is necessary for open-mindedness). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopædia (1728) and the Tradition of CommonplacesRichard YeoIn the fifth volume (1755) of the Encyclopédie in his entry on “En-cyclopædia,” Denis Diderot forecast a time in which the sheer number of books would require a division of intellectual labor. Some people, he said, will not do much rea ding but rather “devote themselves to investigation which will be new, or which they will believe to be new.” (...) The majority, unable to produce anything of their own, “will be busy night and day leafing through these books, taking out of them the fragments they consider worthy of being collected and preserved.” 1 Although Diderot set this prospect in the future, he believed the signs were already visible and offered his encyclo-pædia as a response. Part of this image, however—the selection of passages from a range of authors—was already a familiar one. Re commended by the Ancients, it was widely practised during the Renaissance by the educated elite who kept commonplace books for recording quotations on various themes from Classical authors. Even the epigram from Horace on the title page of the Encyclop édie suggests this lineage: “What grace may be added to commonplace matters by the power of order and connection.” 2In the classical period, the Latin term, locus communis, referred to a general argument capable of being used in different situations. In his Institutiones Oratoriae Quintilian discussed the notion of copia verborum in connection with the ability of a good orator to produce copious illustrations [End Page 157] and embellishments from particular ideas. Renaissance writers thought this facility was enhanced by a record of similar ideas in the same place in a notebook. This practice had been followed in the medieval period, but it became more systematically taugh t as part of rhetoric from the sixteenth century. Commenting on this, R. R. Bolgar wrote:The whole purpose of the Humanists in transmogrifying Greek and Latin literature into a series of notes was to produce a body of material which could be easily retained and repeated. They made titanic efforts to remember the contents of the note-books the y compiled. 3Quintilian’s work, and more immediately, that of the German humanist, Rudolph Agricola, influenced Erasmus in his De Copia, first published in 1512 as De Duplici Copia Verborum ac Rerum Commentarii Duo. This offered advice on how to collect words and passages under various topoi or loci (places) as a means of storing extracts from books that could later be brought together and embellished in either writing or conversation. The set of ideas or themes grouped under one “Head” wer e known as “common-places,” and the notebooks kept for this purpose were commonplace books. 4 These were also called “copie” books in the sense of collections enabling copia, or free flow of material for oratory. Versions of this practice continued into the nineteenth century: figures such as John Milton, George Berkeley, Robert Southey, R obert Burns, and David Thoreau kept commonplace books, some of which were subsequently published. Some of these included less than elevated content: Kenneth Lockridge has uncovered a string of misogynist remarks and anecdotes in the commonplace book of Th omas Jefferson. 5In the only major study of the commonplace tradition, Sister Joan Marie Lechner analyzed its status in Renaissance rhetorical training from the sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, identifying some confusion and [End Page 158] tensions, partly as result of dissatisfaction with the “doctrine of places” taught by classical writers, and also because “commonplace” had come to refer both to a “locus or seat of arguments” and a “speech-within-a-speech.” 6 Her work shows that commonplace books were kept as aids to recall reading and as storehouses (thesauri) of topics and phrases suitable for speeches and conversation, as recommended by Erasmus and other writers. However, Lechner noted a new need pa rtly satisfied by the commonplace collections, which was that they accommodated Renaissance passions for “accumulating universal knowledge.” Thus, in her words:The commonplace book with its encyclopaedic array of topics or places was thought of as a compend of knowledge displayed in a systematic pattern... (shrink)

There has long been a debate on the possible similarity between some forms of Indian and Greek idealistic monism ( Advaita and Neoplatonism ). After a basic historical introduction to the debate, the text proposes that Paramādvaita , also known as Kashmiri Shaivism , is a more suitable comparandum for Neoplatonism than any other form of Advaita , suggested in the debate. Paramādvaita ’s dynamic view of reality summarized in the terms prakāśa-vimarśa or unmeṣa-nimeṣa , corresponds quite precisely to (...) the viewpoint of Neoplatonism , summarized in the similar bipolar terms such as prohodos-epistrophe . The context of the dynamic nature of reality doctrine is also quite similar ( svataḥsiddhatva, authypostasis ). My arguments are based on the texts of Plotinus and Proclus ( Neoplatonism ) and the texts of Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Kṣemarāja ( Paramādvaita ) . Several parallel doctrines of both systems are further discussed: the doctrine of creative multilevel subjectivity , the doctrine of mutual omnipresence of all in all , the doctrine of creative multilevel speech , and some corresponding doctrines on aesthetic beauty and its important role in the Soul’s return towards its ultimate source. Some implications of the high degree of correspondence between both systems are considered at the end of the paper, for instance whether some similarities of compared systems might be explained on a structural basis, since both schools ware facing similar sceptical critique ( Mādhyamika, Hellenistic scepticism ). (shrink)

In his first research project, Greimas developed and applied new methods in the historical lexicology of modern French. His theoretical articles formulate a sociological approach that analyses vocabulary as a history of culture, illustrated in his two dissertations on fashion in 1830. In the 1980s, from the perspective of his semiotics, Greimas dismissed his early scholarship as failed experiments that taught him what not to do. In the changed epistemological context of the 21st century, the work appears as pioneering research (...) in cultural studies which possesses clear scholarly value. Greimas’ philological and lexicological training bore fruit directly and indirectly throughout his career. Two decades before he launched his semiotics, his project for lexicology proposes a semantic methodology, envisions the construction of an organon for the human sciences, and explicitly calls for a multi-generational collaborative enterprise. Like his structural semantics and semiotics, this lexicology entails three inseparable components: epistemological foundations, concrete methodologies, and robust applications. Moreover, a focus on the lexeme characterizes Greimas’ structural semantics and persists in his semiotics.В своей первой научно-исследовательской работе Греймас разработал и применил новые методы в исторической лексикологии современного французского языка. В его теоретических статьях сформулирован социологический подход, который анализирует лексику как историю культуры. Это иллюстрируют две диссертации Греймаса о моде в 1830 году. В 1980-х годах он отошел от своих ранних работ, считая их неудачными. Но в изменившемся эпистемологическом контексте 21-го века эти работы выглядят в культурных исследованиях новаторскими, обладающими несомненными академическими достоинствами. Филологическое и лексикологическое образование Греймаса давало прямые и косвенные результаты в течение всей его карьеры. За два десятилетия до начала семиотических исследований Греймас предлагает в своем лексикологическом проекте семантическую методологию, строительство органона для гуманитарных наук, а также призывает к междисциплинарному сотрудничеству. Как и структурная семантика и семиотика Греймаса, эта лексикология включает в себя три неразделимых компонента: эпистемологические основы, конкретные методологии и возможности применения. Кроме того, внимание к лексеме характеризует всю структурную семантику Греймаса и сохраняется в его семиотике. Oma esimeses teadusprojektis tootas Greimas valja nuudisprantsuse keele ajaloolise leksikoloogia uued meetodid ning rakendas neid. Tema teoreetilistes artiklites sonastatakse sotsioloogiline lahenemine, mis analuusib sonavara kui kultuuriajalugu ja mida illustreerivad tema kaks vaitekirja 1830ndate aastate moe kohta. 1980ndatel aastatel taandus Greimas oma varajastest uurimustest kui ebaonnestunud katsetustest. 21. sajandi muutunud epistemolooglises kontekstis osutub tema looming teedrajavaks uurimistooks kultuuriuuringute vallas. Greimase fi loloogiline ja leksikoloogiline ettevalmistus kandis kogu tema karjaari valtel vilja nii otseselt kui kaudselt. Kaks aastakummet enne seda, kui ta tuli valja oma semiootikaga, pakkus tema leksikoloogiaprojekt valja semantilise metoodika, nagi ette humanitaarteaduste organoni loomist ning kutsus otsesonu ules multidistsiplinaarsele koostoole. Nagu tema strukturaalne semantika ja semiootika sisaldab ka see leksikoloogia kolme uksteisest lahutamatut komponenti: epistemoloogilisi aluseid, konkreetseid meetodeid ja julgeid rakendusi. Lisaks iseloomustab lekseemile keskendumine Greimase strukturaalset semantikat ning jaab pusima tema semiootikas. (shrink)

Architectural Drawings as Investigating Devices explores how the changing modes of representation in architecture and urbanism relate to the transformation of how the addressees of architecture and urbanism are conceived. The book diagnoses the dominant epistemological debates in architecture and urbanism during the 20th and 21st centuries. It traces their transformations, paying special attention to Le Corbusier and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s preference for perspective representation, to the diagrams of Team 10 architects, to the critiques of functionalism, and the (...) upgrade of the artefactual value of architectural drawings in Aldo Rossi, John Hejduk, Peter Eisenman, and Oswald Mathias Ungers, and, finally, to the reinvention of architectural programme through the event in Bernard Tschumi and the Office for Metropolitan Architecture (OMA). Particular emphasis is placed on the spirit of truth and clarity in modernist architecture, the relationship between the individual and the community in post-war era architecture, the decodification of design process as syntactic analogy and the paradigm of autonomy in the 1970s and 1980s architecture, the concern about the dynamic character of urban conditions and the potentialities hidden in architectural programme in the post-autonomy era. This book is based on extensive archival research in Canada, the USA and Europe, and will be of interest to architects, artists, researchers and students in architecture, architectural history, theory, cultural theory, philosophy and aesthetics. (shrink)

AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In Advaitavedānta, the (...) world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

This article discusses ethnoveterinary medical pluralism in Western Kenya. Qualitative methods of data collection such as key informant interviews, open-ended in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), narratives, and participant and direct observations were applied. The study shows that farmers in Nyang’oma seek both curative and preventive medical services for their animals from the broad range of health care providers available to them within a pluralistic medical system. Kleinman’s model of medical pluralism, which describes the professional, folk, and popular sectors, informs (...) this discussion because of its relevance and appropriateness to the study. It is, however, important to note the overlap in the three sectors and to point out that livestock farmers engage in multiple “consultations” based on a combination of their own characteristics and the cost, availability and specialization of health care providers. The study concludes by recognizing the complexity of ethnoveterinary medical pluralism and calls for the integration of a pluralistic perspective into the planning and implementation of animal health care interventions and services. (shrink)

The book Maupassant (1976), which is devoted to an analysis of Maupassant’s short story “Two friends”, is one of A. J. Greimas’ most important works. In it he tried out the semiotic tools he had developed up to that point, tested models for narrative analysis, and anticipated future perspectives in the development of semiotic theory. We discuss how the book puts forward the principle of immanent analysis, and how the “closed” text – the object of semiotic analysis – is constructed. (...) Th e article reveals that while Greimas declares, in the book’s Foreword, that he is distancing from context – the literary sociocultural universe – within the analysis itself he is forced to recognize certain contextual elements. Greimas recognizes the importance of acknowledging contextual facts such as the French concept of patrie and does not attempt to hide certain subjective interpretive elements. Yet at the same time Greimas attempts to suppress context’s invasion of his interpretation. He recognizes the semantic isotopies generated by context to the extent to which they suit the coherence of his analysis, considering them auxiliary in terms of the syntactic and discursive structures of the text. Nevertheless, a contextual isotopy – based on intertextual ties to a Biblical parable – becomes the main one. We come to the conclusion that the principle of immanence in Maupassant is not a negation, but a problematization that demonstrates how relevant contextual material can be integrated into a semiotic analysis.Книга ≪Мопассан≫ (1976), посвященная анализу новеллы ≪Два друга≫ французского писателя XIX века, – один из главных трудов Альгирдаса Юлиуса Греймаса, в котором используются ранее созданные им инструменты семиотического анализа, проверяются и дальше создаются модели нарративного анализа, намечаются будущие перспективы развития семиотической теории. Автор статьи обсуждает, каким образом в книге постулируется принцип имманентного анализа и конструируется ≪закрытый≫ текст – объект семиотического анализа. В статье показывается, что несмотря на то, что в предисловии к работе Греймас декларировал отстранение от контекста – социолектического универсума литературы, в самом анализе Греймас вынужден принимать во внимание определенные элементы контекста, а некоторые из них интегрировать в интерпретацию новеллы. С одной стороны, Греймас признает необходимость считаться с данными контекста, такими как французское понятие родины, и не скрывает некоторых субъективных элементов интерпретации (опираясь на биографические данные, автор статьи обсуждает возможный генезис некоторых из этих элементов). С другой стороны, в то же самое время автор ≪Мопассана≫ старается совладать с ворвавшимся в интерпретацию контекстом. Генерируемые контекстом семантические изотопии он признает настолько, насколько они вписываются в когерентный анализ, и считает их вспомогательными по отношению к синтаксическим и дискурсивным текстовым структурам. Однако в кульминации анализа такая контекстуальная изотопия возвращается интертекстуальной связью с библейской параболой (притчей) и становится главной. Автор статьи делает вывод, что принцип имманентности в ≪Мопассане≫ не отрицается, но становится проблемным, показывая, как релевантные данные контекста могут быть интегрированы в семиотическую интерпретацию. Raamat “Maupassant”, mis on puhendatud 19. sajandi prantsuse kirjaniku novelli “Kaks sopra” analuusile, on uks Algirdas Julius Greimase tahtsamaid toid. Selles katsetas ta semiootilisi tooriistu, mille oli selleks ajaks valja tootanud, pani proovile narratiivianaluusi mudeleid ning jatkas nende loomist ja ennetas tulevikuperspektiive semiootikateooria arengus. Artikli autor vaatleb, kuidas selles teoses esitatakse immanentse analuusi printsiipi ja kuidas konstrueeritakse “suletud” teksti – semiootilise analuusi objekti. Artiklist ilmneb, et kui Greimas kuulutas raamatu eessonas, et ta distantseerub kontekstist – kirjanduslikust sotsiaalmajanduslikust universumist, on ta analuusis eneses sunnitud tunnistama teatavaid kontekstuaalseid elemente ning isegi loimima moningaid neist tolgendusse, mille ta loole annab. Uhest kuljest tunnistab “Maupassant’i” autor selliste kontekstuaalsete faktidega, nagu seda on naiteks Prantsuse moiste ‘patrie’, arvestamise tahtsust ega urita peita teatavaid subjektiivseid interpreteerivaid elemente (artikli autor kasutab nende voimaliku geneesi vaatlemisel biograafi list materjali). Ent samal ajal uritab Greimas alla suruda konteksti pealetungi oma tolgendusele. Konteksti loodud semantilisi isotoope tunnustab ta maaral, mil need sobivad tema analuusi sidususega, pidades neid teksti suntaktilisi ja diskursiivseid struktuure silmas pidades korvalisteks. Siiski saab peamiseks uks kontekstuaalne isotoopia, mis pohineb intertekstuaalsetel sidemetel Piibli vordumiga. Artikli autor jouab jareldusele, et immanentsuse printsiip “Maupassant’is” ei ole eitus, vaid problematiseering, mis toestab, kuidas on voimalik olulist kontekstuaalset materjali semiootilisse analuusi loimida. (shrink)

Teknikens skugga -- Ett sublimt mellan -- Tiden i formen -- Fenomenets blick -- Om bild -- Tolkningsfigurer -- Abstraktioner -- Anteckningar -- Det omåttligas måleri -- Att tänka i skisser.

The aim of the paper is to consider from the perspective of contemporary anthropological linguistics the plausibility of universal, self-evident truths based on innate principles of cognition as they were propounded by Th omas Reid in his philosophy of common sense. The key problem is whether it is possible to trace any innate principles that would underlie common sense, practical knowledge and comprise truths which are selfevident, clear and directly accessible to all members of homo sapiens. Reid’s assumptions are considered (...) in the light of contemporary research on the conceptualization of colour, basic emotions, ethnobotany and spatial cognition. (shrink)

Artiklis arendatakse alternatiivset kontseptsiooni niihästi traditsioonilisele füüsikakesksele teadusliku teooria käsitlusele kui ka seisukohale, et füüsikateooriat ei saa teadusfilosoofias mõista teadusliku teooria mudelina, sest erinevates teadustes on teooriad oma loomult erinevad. Ollakse seisukohal, et teaduslik teooria on ikkagi teadusfilosoofia kategooriana teadusliku distsipliini eripärast sõltumatu. Käsitletakse põhiliselt kahte punkti: (1) miks on teadusfilosoofias põhjust kritiseerida traditsioonilist, füüsika põhjal saadud ettekujutust teaduslikust teooriast? (2) miks ei ole põhjendatud seisukoht, et nt keemias on teaduslik teooria (nt klassikaline keemilise struktuuri teooria) oma loomult füüsikateooriast (nt (...) klassikalisest mehhaanikast) erinev? Traditsioonilise füüsikakeskse lähenemisviisi puhul ei ole piisavalt uuritud, miks õieti füüsikateooria on saanud teadusliku teooria etaloniks. Teoreetilise füüsika keskne teadusekontseptsioon on olnud ühekülgselt orienteeritudmatemaatikale ja loogikale. Kui aga lähtuda teooriast kui mudelite populatsioonist, nagu Ronald Giere on seda teinud ka klassikalise mehhaanika - füüsikakeskse teooriakäsituse traditsioonilise näite - korral, siis osutub see teooriakäsitus tõepoolest invariantseks teatavale tunnetustüübile, mida on alust nimetada teaduslikuks ja mis on selgesti omane ka nt keemiale. In this paper an alternative conception is proposed both to (1) the traditional physics-based conception of scientific theory, and (2) the view that a physical theory cannot be regarded as the model for scientific theory in philosophy of science in general because scientific theories are discipline-dependent. It is argued that scientific theory as a category of philosophy of science is independent of a particular scientific discipline. The main focus of the paper is on two questions: (1) Why is the traditional physics-based conception of scientific theory subject to criticism in philosophy of science? (2) Why is it unjustified to consider a scientific theory in chemistry (e.g., the classical chemical structure theory, which is probably the most characteristic theory of chemistry) to be different in character from a physical theory (e.g., classical mechanics, which is a prototypical example of a theory in the philosophy of science)? In case of the traditional physics-based approach not enough research has been done as to why theories of physics have become the etalon of scientific theory. The accepted view of science, centered on theoretical physics, has been one-sidedly oriented towards mathematics and logic. But when proceeding from a conception of a scientific theory as a population of models, as Ronald Giere has done for the case of classical mechanics - the traditional example of a physical theory -, this conception of a theory really does prove the invariance of a certain type of cognition that can justifiably be called scientific and that is clearly characteristic of, e.g., chemistry as well. (shrink)

Utpaladeva (c. 900–950 C.E.) was the chief originator of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, which was further developed by Abhinavagupta (c. 950–1020 C.E.) and other successors. The Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi, “Proof of a Sentient Knower,” is one component of Utpaladeva’s trio of specialized studies called the Siddhitrayī, “Three Proofs.” This article provides an introduction to and translation of the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi along with the Vṛtti commentary on it by the nineteenth–twentieth century paṇḍit, Harabhatta Shastri. Utpaladeva in this work presents “transcendental” (...) arguments that a universal knower (pramātṛ), the God Śiva, necessarily exists and that this knower is sentient (ajaḍa). He defends the Pratyabhijñā understanding of sentience against alternative views of both Hindu and Buddhist schools. As elsewhere in his corpus, Utpaladeva also endeavors through his arguments to lead students to the recognition (pratyabhijñā) of identity with Śiva, properly understood as the sentient knower. (shrink)